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1. Introduction
This paper focusses on the postulated behaviour of rms competing in
imperfect competitive markets, rst theorized in the late 30s by a number of
well known economists (Robinson (1933), Sweezy (1939)), and best known
as the kinked demand model. This basically predicts an asymmetric be-
haviour of rms in response to a price change, each expecting its rivals to
be more reactive in matching its price cuts than its price increases. This
prediction has been empirically tested by Hall and Hitch (1939) and later by
Bhaskar et al. (1991), extensively criticized as not grounded in rational be-
haviour by Stigler (1947), Domberger (1979), Reid (1981) and more recently
analyzed in a dynamic settings by Marschak and Selten (1978), Maskin and
Tirole (1988) and Bhaskar (1988).
In this paper we add to this debate by showing that this behavioural
rule possesses strong stability properties and, therefore, may sustain rms
collusion. In particular, in a symmetric and monotone market, we prove
that, if every rm adopts and expects a simple kinked demand social norm of
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behaviour (KSN), the symmetric collusive outcome (i.e. monopoly pricing)
constitutes an equilibrium. We show that this result is rather robust and can
be extended to all n-person symmetric strategic form games: a KSN always
makes the symmetric e¢ cient strategy prole (the one maximizing the sum
of all playersutility) stable. Moreover, we show that under some additional
standard assumptions on playersplayo¤ functions, a slightly stronger norm
of behaviour (implicitly implying a norm of reciprocity) makes the e¢ cient
outcome the only stable outcome of the game.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces a game-
theoretic setting. Section 3 concludes.
2. A General Setting
We rst introduce a class of games in which players are endowed with
the same strategy space and perceive symmetrically all strategy proles of
the game. Moreover, playerspayo¤s possess a monotonicity property with
respect to their opponentschoices. Although very specic, this setting still
covers many well known economic applications (as Cournot and Bertrand
oligopoly, public goods games and many others). We denote a monotone
symmetric n-player game in strategic form as a triple G =
 
N; (Xi; ui)i2N

,
in which N = f1; :::; i; :::; ng is the nite set of players, Xi is player is
strategy set and ui : XN ! R+ is player is payo¤ function, where XN =
X1  :::  Xn denotes the Cartesian product of playersstrategy sets. We
assume that each strategy set is partially ordered by the relation . We
assume the following.
P.1 (Symmetry) Xi = X for each i 2 N . Moreover, for every i 2 N ,
x 2 XN and any permutation of playersindexes (N) : N ! N
(2.1) ui(x1; x2; ::; xn) = u(i)(x(1); x(2); ::; x(n)):
P.2 (Monotone Spillovers) For every i; j 2 N with j 6= i, we have either:
(2.2) ui(x j ; x0j)  ui(x j ; xj) for every x and x0j  xj
or
(2.3) ui(x j ; x0j)  ui(x j ; xj) for every x and x0j  xj ;
where x j = (x1; ::; xj 1; xj+1; ::; xn).
We will talk of positive spillovers (PS) when (2.2) holds and of negative
spillovers (NS) when (2.3) holds. A strategy prole x is symmetric if it
prescribes the same strategy to all players. A Pareto Optimum (PO) for G
is a strategy prole xo such that there exists no alternative prole which is
preferred by all players and is strictly preferred by at least one player. A
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Pareto E¢ cient (PE) prole xe maximizes the sum of payo¤s of all players
in N .
We now introduce the notion of a generic social norm of behaviour.1
Definition 1. (Social norm of behaviour). We say that the social norm
of behaviour  : X 7! Xn 1 is active in G if every player i 2 N deviating
from a given prole of strategies x 2 XN by means of the alternative strategy
x0i 2 Xi such that x0i 6= xi, expects the response Nni(x0i) from all players
j 2 Nn fig.
Finally, let us introduce a general denition of stability of a strategy
prole in our game G; under any arbitrary social norm of behaviour.
Definition 2. A strategy prole x 2 XN is stable under the social norm
 if there exists no i 2 N and x0i 2 Xi such that
ui(x
0
i;Nnfig(x
0
i)) > ui(x) 8i 2 N .
We are interested in the Kinked Social Norm (KSN) of behaviour. The
original idea of the kinked demand model (Robinson 1936, Sweezy 1939) was
based on the assumption that rms competing in a common market would
react to changes in rivals prices in an asymmetric manner. Specically,
when a rm raises its price it expects the other rms to raise their price
comparatively less (under-reaction); when a rm lowers its price, conversely,
it expects the others to reduce even more their price (over-reaction). If rms
set quantities instead of prices the above norm of behaviour would require
that rms expect their rival to over-react when increasing their quantity and
under-react when decreasing their quantity. In general, this social norm can
be dened in abstract terms in the way that follows.
Definition 3. (Kinked Social Norm) A Kinked Social Norm of behav-
iour (KSN) k is dened as follows: for each i 2 N , and x0i:
(2.4) kNnfig(x0i) =

x i 2 Xn 1jxj  x0i 8j 2 Nn fig
	
under positive spillovers(PS) and
(2.5) kNnfig(x0i) =

x i 2 Xn 1jxj  x0i 8j 2 Nn fig
	
:
under negative spillovers(NS).
Note that, according to the denition above, the KSN imposes to all
agents in Nn fig to play a strategy lower (greater) or equal than the strategy
played by the deviating player i under positive (negative) spillovers. Behind
the KSN of behaviour there is no presumption of rational behaviour and
playersreactions may easily not correspond to their best reply mappings
(see below for a brief digression on this point).
We are now ready to present the main result of the paper.
1See, for instance, Bicchieri, 1990.
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Proposition 1. Let conditions P1-P2 hold on G. Then, under the
Kinked Social Norm of behaviour(KSN), all symmetric Pareto e¢ cient strat-
egy proles of G are stable.
Proof. We know by denition 1 that KSN implies xj  x0i for all xj 2
kNnfig(x
0
i) under positive spillovers (PS) and xj  x
0
i for all xj 2 kNnfig(x
0
i)
under negative spillovers (NS). Assume rst positive spillovers (PS) on G
and suppose that the symmetric e¢ cient prole (PE) xe 2 XN is not stable
and there exists a i 2 N and a x0i 2 Xi such that
(2.6) ui(x
0
i;kNnfig(x
0
i)) > ui(x
e):
Using PS and the fact that kj(x
0
i)  x0i for every j 2 Nn fig, we obtain
(2.7) ui(x
0
i; :::; x
0
i)  ui(x
0
i;kNnfig(x
0
i)) > ui(x
e)
and therefore, by P1,
(2.8)
X
i2N
ui(x
0
i; :::; x
0
i) >
X
i2N
ui(x
e);
which contradicts the e¢ ciency of xe.
Assume now that under negative spillovers (NS) there exists a player
i 2 N with a x0i 2 Xi such that
(2.9) ui(x
0
i;kNnfig(x
0
i)) > ui(x
e):
By NS and the fact that kj(x
0
i)  x0i it must be that
(2.10) ui(x
0
i; :::; x
0
i)  ui(x
0
S ;kNnfig(x
0
i)) > ui(x
e)
which, again, leads to a contradiction. 
Proposition 1 simply tells us that if the expected behaviour of players
in the event of a deviation from an e¢ cient strategy prole is described by
the kinked social norm, then every such e¢ cient prole, if reached, is stable.
In terms of imperfect competition, the expected kinked behaviour of rms
makes collusion a stable outcome.
The example below makes clear that stable ine¢ cient (and asymmetric)
outcomes cannot be ruled out without adding more structure to the above
analysis.
Example 1. (2-player symmetric and positive spillovers game)
A B C
A 4,4 2,3 1,2
B 3,2 2,2 1,2
C 2,1 2,1 1,1
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In this game we assume that playersstrategy can be ordered and, e.g.,
A  B  C, therefore the game respects both P.1 and P.2, with posi-
tive spillovers (PS). In this game, (A;A); the PE strategy prole, is ob-
viously stable under KSN. If, say player 1 deviates playing B, KSN im-
plies k2(B) = fB;Cg and player 1 ends up with a lower payo¤ than be-
fore, since u1 (A;A) > u1 (B;B) > u1 (B;C). By symmetry, the same
happens to player 2. However, asymmetric ine¢ cient strategy proles as
(B;A), (A;B), (C;A) and (A;C) are also stable under KSN, given that
u1 (B;A) > u1 (A;B) > u1 (A;C) and u1 (C;A) > u1 (B;B) > u1 (B;C)
and the same for player 2.
To strengthen the result of proposition 1 and rule out ine¢ cient stable
outcomes, we add the following assumptions on the structure of G.
P3. Each players strategy set is a compact and convex subset of the set
of real numbers.
P4. Each player is payo¤ function u(x) is continuous in x and strictly
quasiconcave in xi.
Under these additional conditions, Lemma 1 in the appendix shows that
there is a unique Pareto E¢ cient strategy prole of G, and it is symmetric.
In order to rule out all ine¢ cient stable outcomes, we need to rene the so-
cial norm employed in proposition 1. Intuitively, the kinked norm imposes
an upper bound on the protability of deviations, and was therefore useful
to show that e¢ cient proles are stable. In order to rule out the stability
of ine¢ cient proles, we need to impose a lower bound on the protability
of deviations. We do so by imposing a "symmetric" social norm of behav-
iour, which essentially prescribes players to mimic the strategy adopted by
a deviator.
Definition 4. (Symmetric Social Norm) The Symmetric Social Norm
of behaviour (SSN) s is described as follows: for each i 2 N , and x0i:
(2.11) sNnfig(x0i) =

x i 2 Xn 1jxj = x0i 8j 2 Nn fig
	
:
We are now ready to prove the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Let the game G satisfy conditions P1-P4. Then, under
the Symmetric Social Norm of behaviour the (symmetric) Pareto e¢ cient
prole xe 2 XN is the unique stable strategy prole.
Proof. Consider rst the e¢ cient prole xe, which, by Lemma 1, must
be symmetric. Suppose player i has a protable deviation x0i. Using the Sym-
metric Social Norm (SSN), the expected payo¤ for i would be ui(x0i; :::; x
0
i).
By symmetry, the same payo¤ level would be obtained by all other players
in Nn fig. We conclude thatX
N
uh(x
0
i; :::; x
0
i) >
X
N
uh(x
e)
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which contradicts the e¢ ciency of xe. We next show that all ine¢ cient
proles are not stable. The argument for ine¢ cient symmetric proles is
trivial: thanks to the Symmetric Social Norm (SSN), it is enough for any
player i to switch to the e¢ cient prole to improve upon any ine¢ cient
strategy prole. Consider then an asymmetric prole x0. Let i be one player
such that ui(x0) < ui(xe) (obviously, such a player must exist by e¢ ciency
of xe and ine¢ ciency of x0). By continuity of payo¤s, there exists some
strategy xi close enough to xei such that
ui(x
e)  ui(xi; :::; xi) < ui(xe)  ui(x0):
Since the prole (xi; :::; xi) can be induced by player i thanks to SSN, player
i has a protable deviation, and the result follows. 
Finally, a relevant question to raise is whether the behaviour predicted by
the model of kinked demand can in general be considered rational. About
this issue, it can be shown that in all symmetric supermodular games in
which strategy sets are ordered, the behaviour postulated by the kinked
demand model is fully compatible with playersrationality. The same cannot
be said when games are submodular, i.e. when playersactions are strategic
substitutes and their best responses negatively sloped.
3. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that, for all symmetric and monotone
strategic form games, the behaviour postulated by the classical model of
kinked demand possesses strong stability properties. Such a result holds
even stronger when players expect a fully symmetric norm of behaviour by
all remaining players in the event of an individual deviation. In this case, the
perfectly cooperative (collusive) outcome becomes the only stable outcome
of the game, As a consequence, rms may implicitly adopt such norms of be-
haviour in order to implement tacit collusion and sustain perfectly collusive
outcome in imperfectly competitive markets.
4. Appendix
Lemma 1. Let the game G satisfy conditions P1-P4. Then, there is
a unique strategy prole xe = argmaxx2XN
P
i2N ui(x) and it is such that,
xe1 = x
e
2 = ::: = x
e
n.
Proof. Compactness of eachXi implies compactness ofXN : Continuity
of each players payo¤ ui(x) on x implies the continuity of the social payo¤
function uN =
P
i2N ui(x). Existence of an e¢ cient prole (PE) x
e 2 XN
directly follows from Weiestrass theorem.We rst prove that a PE strategy
prole is symmetric.
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Suppose xei 6= xej for some i; j 2 N: By symmetry we can derive from xe
a new vector x0 by permuting the strategies of players i and j such that
(4.1)
X
i2N
ui(x
0
) =
X
i2N
ui(x
e)
and hence, by the strict quasiconcavity of all ui(x); for all  2 (0; 1) we have
that:
(4.2)
X
i2N
ui(x
0 + (1  )xe) >
X
i2N
ui(x
e):
Since, by the convexity of X; the strategy vector (x0 + (1  )xe) 2 XN ;
we obtain a contradiction. Finally, by the strict quasiconcavity of both
individual and social payo¤s in each players strategy, the e¢ cient prole xe
can be easily proved to be unique. 
References
[1] Bhaskar, V. (1988), The Kinked Demand Curve - A Game Theoretic Approach,
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 6, pp.373-384.
[2] Bhaskar, V., S. Machin and G. Reid (1991), Testing a model of the Kinked Demand
Curve, The Journal oF Industrial Economics, 39, 3, pp.241-254.
[3] Bicchieri, C. (1990), Norms of Cooperation, Ethics, 100, pp.838-861.
[4] Domberger, S. (1979), Price Adjustment and Market Structure, Economic Journal,
89, pp.96-108.
[5] Hall, R.L. and Hitch, C. J.(1939), Price Theory and Business Behaviour, Oxford
Economic Papers, 2, pp.12-45.
[6] Marschak, T. and R., Selten (1978), Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames
and Oligopolistic Equilibria, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92, pp.71-93.
[7] Maskin, E. and J., Tirole (1988), A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competi-
tion, Kinked Demand Curves and Edgeworth Cycles, Econometrica, 56, pp.571-599.
[8] Reid, G., C. (1981), The Kinked Demand Curve Analysis of Oligopoly. Edimburgh,
Edimburgh University Press.
[9] Robinson, J. (1933), Economics of Imperfect Competition, London, Macmillan.
[10] Stigler, G. (1947), The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid Prices, Journal
of Political Economy, 55, pp. 432-447.
[11] Sweezy, P. M. (1939), Demand under Conditions of Oligopoly, Journal of Political
Economy, 47, pp.568-573.
